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Abstract 
The terms of a commercial property lease covers aspects such as rent, alterations to premises and the 
ability to leave; consequently they have a significant impact on cash flow and the ability of a business to 
develop. 
 In contrast to the heavily-legislated residential sector, commercial landlords and tenants in the UK are 
largely free to negotiate the terms of their contract.  Yet, since the property crash of 1989/90, 
successive governments have taken an interest in commercial leasing; in particular there is a desire to 
see landlords being more flexible. 
UK Government policy in this area has been pursued through industry self-regulation rather than 
legislation; since 1995 there have been three industry codes of practice on leasing.  These codes are 
sanctioned by government and monitored by them. Yet, 15 years after the first code was launched, 
many in the industry see the whole code concept as ineffective and unlikely to ever achieve changes to 
certain aspects of landlord behaviour.    
This paper is the first step in considering the lease codes in the wider context of industry self-
regulation. The aim of the paper is twofold:  First a framework is created using the literature on 
industry self-regulation from various countries and industries which suggests key criteria to explain the 
effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of self-regulation.  This is then applied to the UK lease codes based on 
research carried out by the authors for the UK Government to monitor the success of all three codes.   
The outcome is a clearer understanding of the possibilities and limitations of using a voluntary solution 
to achieve policy aims within the property industry. 
 
Key words: Commercial leases, self-regulation, UK 
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Introduction 
Commercial leasing operates within a wide variety of regulatory regimes across the globe.  In the UK it 
is not heavily regulated.  There are some statutory limits on certain lease provisions, and statute 
provides and governs the right to renew leases, but, on the whole, the UK law does not directly control 
the terms that the parties to a commercial lease are able to negotiate. There is not even a statutory or 
common law requirement for terms to be fair or reasonable.   
That does not mean that UK governments have no interest in lease terms.  Commercial leases contain 
provisions defining and affecting key aspects of the occupation of premises (as noted in Crosby et al 
2006a, 2006b); these can impact on the ability of a business to develop and grow, or even to contract. 
Consequently commercial leasing has been linked to Government enterprise and productivity agendas, 
for example in the UK Government Budget Statement of 2005: 
The Government’s strategy for closing the productivity gap in this environment has two broad 
strands: maintaining macroeconomic stability to help businesses and individuals plan for the 
future; and implementing microeconomic reforms to remove the barriers that prevent markets 
from functioning efficiently and flexibly. Effective and well-focused regulation can play a vital 
role in correcting market failures, promoting fairness and competition, and driving up 
standards. However, inefficient regulation can impose a significant burden on business.”     
HM Treasury (2005) Budget Statement, paragraph 3.2 
 
In the same chapter, the statement discusses commercial lease flexibility.  In response to a University of 
Reading report on the operation of the commercial leasing market (Crosby et al, 2004), the Budget 
statement commented: 
 
 “While the Government welcomes the recent trend towards greater market flexibility, it 
believes much more can be done to strengthen the impact of the code of practice on the market. 
It will continue to work with the industry on strengthening the code, but remains willing to 
pursue legislation if further movements towards greater market flexibility are not forthcoming.”  
HM Treasury (2005) Budget Statement, paragraph 3.119 
 
The enduring importance of the enterprise and productivity agenda means that successive 
governments have, especially since the property crash of 1989/90, taken an increasing interest in 
commercial leasing. 
This interest started life as a threat to legislate on the specific areas of upward only rent reviews, 
confidentiality clauses and rent determination processes at rent review and lease renewal (DOE 1993).  
However this didn’t materialise, instead the property industry proposed a system of self-regulation. 
This route was endorsed by government and led to the first Code of Practice for Commercial Leases 
(RICS 1995),  developed by a committee of stakeholders in the leasing process including organisations 
representing landlords, tenants and the land and law professions.  Some fifteen years later, self 
regulation is still the means by which leasing is held in check; the industry is currently operating the 
third edition of the Code (Joint Working Group on Commercial Leases, 2007). 
It is proving difficult to declare self regulation on leasing to be a ‘success’, or even to determine how to 
assess the extent to which it can be seen to be a successful system in terms of achieving policy 
objectives.   This is despite research commissioned by the Government to monitor the operation of the 
successive Codes and undertaken by the University of Reading which found that: The first code was 
poorly disseminated (DETR 2000); The dissemination of the second Code was better but not seen to be 
directly influencing leasing negotiations or practice (Crosby et al 2005); There is a low level of 4 
 
awareness of the third version of the code and again little direct use of it in practice (Crosby and 
Hughes 2009).   
These latest findings prompted a ministerial statement (Austin, 2009) expressing disappointment that 
small business tenants are not being told about the code and it is not a “primary tool for the 
negotiation of new leases” except in the hands of a few large tenants.  There has been an increasing 
focus on small business tenants as the code has developed, to such an extent that it now appears that 
their awareness and ‘use of the code’ is the primary measure of the response of the market. The 
minister called on the property industry to respond or face legislation.   
However, over the fifteen years spanned by the three codes, changes have taken place that would 
seem to be in line with government ambitions.  There is increased diversity of lease lengths, including 
short leases without rent reviews, increased incidence of break clauses, changes to the approach to 
repairing liabilities and to subletting that are more subtle but significant.  These are well documented 
by Crosby et al (2005) and accepted by all stakeholders in the process, including Government.  
However, the Code monitoring also identified that these changes are essentially market driven, 
although the various incarnations of the code and the associated threats of legislation certainly played 
their part in encouraging change (Crosby et al 2005). 
Research into the Codes so far has not actually attempted to address the wider issues of the advantages 
and limitations of using a voluntary solution to achieve policy aims within the property industry. This 
paper aims to move in this direction. It provides a first step in considering the lease codes in the wider 
context of industry self-regulation. The aim of the paper is twofold:  First a review of literature on 
industry self-regulation is undertaken to help understand the key dimensions of self-regulation and, in 
particular, to suggest key criteria which may explain the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of self-
regulation.  Second, the UK commercial lease codes are then considered in the light of this literature 
and criteria, using the existing research carried out by the authors to monitor the success of these 
codes.   We hope to then have the beginnings of a clearer understanding of the role self regulation can 
play in commercial leasing, make some preliminary conclusions on the success of these codes and 
suggest the further research needed to strengthen any findings. 
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Background literature on self regulation 
Definition and scope 
 A commonly cited definition of industry self-regulation is “a regulatory process whereby an industry-
level, as opposed to a governmental- or firm-level, organization (such as a trade association or 
professional society) sets and enforces rules and standards relating to the conduct of firms in the 
industry” (Gupta and Lad, 1983: 417) This definition doesn’t preclude the involvement of government in 
the process, but places the primary responsibility for setting up and operating the regulatory regime 
with the industry body. For Hemphill (1992), key characteristics are that the development of self-
regulation is voluntary and that it covers behaviour that is discretionary. 
The scope of self regulation is wide.  Gunningham and Rees (1997) make a distinction between 
economic and social self-regulation, the former being about controlling the market and the latter about 
the unacceptable consequences of business activities for the environment, workforce, customers or 
clients. It is the latter that concerns us in the current study.  
Durkheim (1933) saw mediating institutions, such as industry organisations, being in a good position to 
promote shared ethical practices within an industry.  He saw them as ‘moralising’ industrial and 
commercial life by creating a normative framework.  Adding to this moral leadership, proponents of self 
regulation argue that codes can deal with moral issues that governments find difficult to tackle or 
define, such as taste and decency and (in the case of the advertising industry at least) can even be 
tougher than legislation (Boddewyn, 1985).  Boddewyn further argues, through his study of the 
advertising industry, that because an industry has a sense of ownership of the rules on behaviour, they 
are accepted and enforced from within the industry without the hostile response that often 
accompanies legal solutions.  Braithwaite (1993) argues that this sense of commitment can achieve 
better results than government regulation. 
However, self regulation is not without its critics.  Braithwaite exemplifies much of the criticisms in 
saying that self-regulation is “frequently an attempt to deceive the public into believing in the 
responsibility of a[n] irresponsible industry.  Sometimes it is a strategy to give the government an 
excuse for not doing its job.”  (1993: 91). Gunningham and Rees (1997) put it another way, saying that 
an accusation levelled at self-regulation is that it serves the industry rather than the public interest.  
They similarly note that it can be seen as a mechanism to ward off state intervention.   The European 
Consumer Law Group makes plain its view that voluntary codes are a last resort for consumer 
protection and that “the mere existence of a code can seriously undermine the case for future 
legislative reform” (ECLG 1983: 211).  Clearly, self regulation has the potential to be self serving but as 
Gunningham and Rees note, the important questions are about the circumstances in which industry 
self-regulation is self-serving and, alternatively, under what circumstances it may become a “force for 
moral constraint and aspiration in industrial and commercial life” (1997: 373).   
The centrality of an industry organisation, such as a trade association, to self regulation would seem 
apparent.   Gunningham and Rees (1997:373) describe the importance of the industry as an 
’organizational field’, a force with the potential to bridge the gap between individual firms and society 
and so to instigate change.  They cite examples of the chemical manufacturing industry’s global 
Responsible Care Program and the American Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and their 
success in achieving a shift in industrial morality in response to particular events and social change.  
However,  the notion of organizational field is more complex than simply trade organisations, and as 
such may be a more relevant concept in real estate where there is no single trade association to act as 6 
 
an umbrella organisation.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 148) define an organizational field as “those 
organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life”.  This casts the 
net wider than a single industry body and includes suppliers, competing firms, consumers, regulatory 
agencies and so on.  Notably the Lease Code was drawn up by a working group representing these 
various players rather than a trade association; the relevance of this remains to be seen.  
The Regulation and self-regulation continuum 
Gupta and Lad (1983) recognise that self regulation often coexists with government oversight and also 
with the threat of direct regulation.  Gunningham and Rees argue that where there is a large gap 
between the interests of the individual firm and that of the public, self regulation may simply not be 
able to bridge the gap by itself.   Boddewyn (1985) concludes that the interaction of the two is needed 
to control advertising behaviour, although he sees this manifesting in different solutions in different 
countries and different industries. Even if self regulation can provide the mechanisms for control, 
Hemphill (2004) argues that the public must be kept informed; truthful performance metrics are all 
important to convince the public that there is no need for government regulation. 
Gunningham and Rees (1997) develop the idea of a continuum upon which government and self 
regulation interact and co-exist.  The issue for them is to determine ‘principles of institutional diagnosis’ 
to design the structures of co-existence.  They argue that regulation policy must respond to industry 
structure; this notion of responsive regulation is one associated with Nonet & Selznick (1978) which has 
been developed and argued by others such as Ayres and Braithwaite (1995).     Put simply, the idea is 
that some industries have the capacity for effective self regulation while others do not and regulation 
should respond to this.  An example cited by Gunningham and Rees to show how government might 
respond to an industry with the ability to self regulate, is that of health care in the USA.  Industry self 
regulation under the auspices of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
was eventually given responsibility and a major role in determining which hospitals could get Medicare 
funds from the state (1997:397). 
A normative framework 
Gunningham and Rees referencing Durkheim’s idea of moralising industrial life, argue that “an industry 
association must establish a normative framework for its members and, equally important, develop 
ways to ensure its efficacy.” (1997: 372).  The development of an industry morality and the associated 
normative framework is, according to Gunningham and Rees (1997: 376) an important first step in 
industry self-regulation.   They distil a set of principles and practices which, they argue, must be 
institutionalised through the development of industry –wide policies and procedures to ensure the 
commitment of firms.    The seven features which are central to this framework are: 
1.  It provides a shared basis for challenging, questioning and guiding industry practices.  Looking 
at these things from different standpoints to standard market view.  
2.  It is a product of reflection and conscious deliberation.  
3.  It recognises multiple values and commitments.  Economic self-interest is recognised but 
organisations are asked to become less single-minded. 
4.  It takes a critical standpoint – assuming practices can be changed in light of reflection. 
5.  It creates a framework that defines and upholds a special organisational competence such as 
practicing sustainable forestry or operating nuclear reactors safely and reliably. 
6.  There is an expectation of willing obedience but not grudging acquiescence.  
7.  It provides a legitimate account of the industry’s activities to the public.  7 
 
This clearly sets out underpinning principles as well as associated practical manifestations.   Key aspects 
of this are open and inclusive development, continual reflection and review, willing compliance and 
accountability to the public.   
Free riders 
The issue of willing compliance, or rather the converse, is one that exercises the minds of many 
researchers; Gunningham and Rees argue that it is important that a system of self regulation prevents 
free riders. If a code is brought into operation without the full involvement of the industry players then 
this free riding may undermine the operation of the code (and they argue that legislative backing may 
be needed).  Alternatively if there is full agreement but some then feign compliance self-regulation can 
address this through peer pressure and formal sanctions.  
Lennox (2004), in his study of environmental self regulatory schemes, considered how to avoid the 
problems that he saw when free-riders caused firms to leave the scheme, potentially leading to its 
collapse.  He postulated that if participants get a benefit from taking part then they will do it even if 
some of the benefits spill over to non-participants. He identified four types of benefit that could ensure 
participants did not leave despite some non-compliance: 
1.  Operational benefits:  He found that participants in the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
Program (RCP) actually got efficiency savings.  
2.  Affiliation benefits:  He notes that a condition of membership of the American Chemistry Council 
(ACC) was participation in the RCP.  Therefore he argues that if the benefits of being in ACC 
outweigh costs of joining and being in the RCP then firms will not leave. 
3.  Signalling benefits:  Taking part distinguishes good firms from bad. 
4.  Legitimacy benefits:  By being part of the scheme, a firm may become more attractive as a trading 
partner or in some other way get preferable treatment from suppliers etc.  (For this point he refers 
to work of institutional scholars such as DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and North (1990)). 
Lennox’s work found that participants in the RCP were better off by being in it, but then so were the 
non-participants.  Therefore despite the operational benefits, the issue remains as Hemphill (1992) 
notes, where the problems of free riders may put those that abide by a code at an economic 
disadvantage as they are bearing the cost of the ‘public goods’ that are effectively provided for all in the 
industry regardless of their contribution. Lennox found that a group of large visible firms continued to 
support the RCP and so ensured its continuance. “For policymakers, this raises interesting questions 
about how to respond to self-regulatory efforts that are in part successful and yet still suffer from free 
riding and opportunism.” (Lennox, 2006: 687) 
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A possible framework 
In order to evaluate the property industry and the Lease Code as a system of self regulation, a 
framework is needed that allows us to interrogate the system of self regulation, which will then enable 
us to assess issues such as the extent to which there is an institutional morality, a robust normative 
framework, and a mechanism to ensure compliance.  Issues such as the role of government and public 
perceptions also need a framework for evaluation.   We can then comment on the extent to which the 
industry has the capacity for self regulation, both generally and in the case of leasing in particular. 
There is potentially a useful practical tool produced by the Canadian Office of Consumer Affairs, an 
organisation which has, over many years, undertaken research and actively promoted debate in the use 
of voluntary codes.  This has led them to produce a guide to the development of voluntary codes (Office 
of Consumer Affairs, 1998) and subsequently a framework for evaluating voluntary codes (Industry 
Canada, 2002).  Figure 1 sets out the main headings of their framework with the associated issues.   For 
each of the issues, the framework includes a set of performance indicators which can be used to 
answer the various questions.   The main headings are Due Process, Relevance, Success and Alternative 
Approaches. 
The concerns over due process resonate with the establishment of a normative framework discussed by 
Gunningham and Rees.  The performance indicators suggested to evaluate due process revolve around 
the meaningful involvement of all industry players and other stakeholders, including government, in the 
development of the code, so according with the notion of a shared basis and a process of conscious 
deliberation.  Similarly, such involvement should mean that there is ‘willing obedience’.  Overall, the 
notion of due process is about inclusivity in development but also about ensuring that the burden of 
development and implementation is fairly spread.  It also includes notions of clarity in communication, 
fair and independent, monitoring procedures through to complaints procedures and proportional 
consequences of non-compliance.  
Ensuring relevance is an important aspect of the Canadian framework, which reinforces the idea that an 
industry must be constantly reflecting and reviewing the operation of a code to refine, develop or 
simply scrap it if it is no longer required.  
To measure the success of a code, the framework questions the measurable achievements, the 
behaviour of individual firms and their internal processes with respect to the code as well as the 
institutionalisation of the code within the industry.  
Finally alternative approaches questions whether the voluntary code could be reinforced or whether 
alternatives such as legislation would do a better job.  The public perception of relevance and success is 
also considered here. 
In the light of the literature review, this framework appears compelling as a format to use to in respect 
of the Lease Code.  Therefore, in the next section we first briefly set out the content and mechanics of 
the Lease Code and then attempt to answer each of the questions in Fig. 1 for this specific voluntary 
code.   9 
 
Framework for evaluating voluntary codes 
Evaluation factor  Issues 
Due Process  Has code development been open, transparent, fair and meaningful? 
  Is the implementation of the code fair? 
  Are the requirements of the code clear? 
  Are there fair procedures for monitoring and enforcement? 
  Are there fair procedures for dispute settlement, complaints and 
sanctions? 
  Is there a range of appropriate negative consequences and incentives for 
compliance? 
  Are the negative and positive incentives used? 
   
Relevance  Does the voluntary code address a fundamental problem or actual need? 
  Are there competing codes or legislative instruments? 
   
Success  Have the objectives of the code been achieved? 
  Are the firms capable of compliance? 
  Are there incentives for compliance? 
  Is there an industry organization or another group to develop and 
administer the code? 
  Are there mechanisms to hold the industry or firm accountable for 
compliance with the code? 
  Are there sanctions or negative consequences for non-compliance? 
  Are sanctions or negative consequences used? 
  Are there unintended or negative effects of the code? 
  Are there champions of the code? 
  Has an industry code achieved wide coverage? 
   
Alternative approaches  Has the coverage been as wide as anticipated? 
  Are the sanctions in the voluntary code adequate? 
  Does the code cover interjurisdictional situations? 
  Is there a need for uniformity of rules? 
  Does the voluntary code require additional credibility? 
  Is independent monitoring, enforcement or adjudication required? 
  Are sufficient resources being devoted to the code (for rule making, 
communication, monitoring, enforcement, adjudication, sanctions and 
revision)? 
Fig 1: Framework for evaluating voluntary codes. Source:  Industry Canada 2002 
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Evaluating the Lease Code 
Outline of current code 
Having already set out the background to the lease code concept and its development, the initial focus 
of this section is on the requirements of the current code and processes surrounding its operation.    
The 3
rd edition has two main objectives.  It promotes specific lease clauses and behaviours and has a 
more general stated objective to “promote fairness in commercial leases”.  There is also an information 
dissemination role and a further objective is stated to be “to ensure that parties to a lease have easy 
access to information explaining the commitments they are making in clear English.”  It consists of three 
parts: 
1.  A guide for landlords with 10 specific requirements in order for their lease to be Code-compliant;  
2.  A guide for occupiers, explaining terms and providing helpful tips; and  
3.  A model Heads of Terms (which can be completed on line and downloaded).  
(JWGCL, 2007) 
It was developed over many months by working group representing various stakeholders including 
landlords, tenant bodies, property and legal advisers and government.   The group was clear that it 
wanted to produce a code that could be of practical use for the parties to lease transactions.  This can 
be seen in the extract of the landlord code reproduced in appendix 1. This is the opening text:  
This revised lease code is the result of pan-industry discussion between representatives of landlords, 
tenants and government. The objective is to create a document which is clear, concise and authoritative.   
However, our aims are wider. We want the lease code to be used as a checklist for negotiations before 
the grant of a lease and lease renewals. Landlords should be transparent about any departures from the 
code in a particular case and the reasons for them.   
(JWGCL, 2007) 
The code was launched by a government minister in February 2007 and she welcomed “plans for wide 
dissemination of the Code” (Cooper 2007).   However, the research done by Crosby and Hughes (2009) 
found that the dissemination of the code and attempts to ensure its adoption differed between the 
various members of the code working group.  For example, the BPF implemented initiatives such as the 
Commercial Landlord Accreditation Scheme (CLAS) and the ‘Pledges of support from law firms and 
agents’, to encourage good practice in general and adoption of the Lease Code in particular. On the 
other hand the RICS and the Law Society publicised the Code through various journals, newsletters, e-
bulletins etc. as well as seminars and other events.   The RICS introduced an initiative to encourage 
banks to promote the Code to small businesses. The Law Society produced a business lease, for short 
term lettings of simple premises, which explicitly conforms to the Code.   
While this shows a range of initiatives to encourage its use, there is no overall and continuing system of 
accreditation, monitoring or audit of compliance with the code.  11 
 
The current code; answering Industry Canada’s questions 
The detailed answers to each of the questions is set out in Appendix 2 
Due process 
The development process appears to have been open, transparent, fair and meaningful with wide 
consultation.  The resulting suite of documents contains clear requirements for landlords during lease 
negotiations and during the life of a lease.  However, due process fails in two key respects.  First, there 
is no single ‘industry’ to take on responsibilities under the code; there are several groups who need to 
act to make the code work by implementing its requirements.  For example some lease clauses will be 
agreed by the landlord’s property agent (such as lease term) and others (such as assignment 
arrangements) are likely to be the responsibility of the lawyers.  The responsibility for ongoing 
management is likely to be given to a (different) firm of managing agents.  This means that 
implementation is fragmented.   There are no processes for monitoring and enforcement (beyond the 
periodic and high level monitoring commissioned by government).  Similarly there are no real incentives 
to comply, or negative consequences for those that do not.    
Relevance 
Given the composition of the code working group, including representatives of several occupier groups, 
it perhaps can be assumed that the code is addressing relevant issues.   It has been revised three times 
to respond to changing circumstances and the findings of research into its effectiveness (DETR, 2000, 
Crosby et al 2005).  Other research into landlord and tenant relations suggests that the issues are still 
very much alive (see for example the Occupier Satisfaction Index report (Property Industry Alliance and 
Corenet global (2009)). 
Success 
This is really not clear, largely because of the lack of mechanisms to implement and monitor the 
operation of the code at a detailed level.   There are certainly organisations representing various 
stakeholders as well as firms and individuals that are championing the code; there are also firms with 
the expertise and capacity to implement compliance regimes.  However, as discussed above, without 
the overall industry body to administer the scheme, the implementation is fragmented.  Dissemination 
is the only issue concerning the latest code to be addressed so far and it was found that the code was 
reaching even fewer tenants than its predecessor and a minority of small landlords.  It is difficult to see 
how a code can be considered a success if it is not even reaching those to which it is aimed, even before 
any assessment of its impact on the behaviour of those it does reach (Crosby and Hughes 2009). 
Alternative approaches 
Given the lack of measurable success and the lack of mechanisms to implement and monitor the 
operation of the code, alternative approaches may seem to be necessary.  This may be legislation, some 
system of mandatory use by professionals and/or the introduction of a monitoring body and associated 
systems.   However, the financing of such systems may be controversial. There are examples of where 
legislation has been used to regulate the process of leasing to new tenants; for example, the case of 
retail leases/tenants in Australia (see, for example, Australian Government Productivity Commission 
(2008); Crosby (2007)) 
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Conclusions 
The Lease Code has been developed and revised over 15 years; those involved have responded to 
changing circumstances and the findings of research on its effectiveness.  The third edition of the Code 
reflects a concerted effort by a wide range of stakeholders to produce a code that can be implemented 
and can achieve the objectives of promoting fairness and ensuring access to information.  However, 
despite these efforts the code cannot be seen as measurably successful.  There is no normative 
framework necessary to ensure that self-regulation works and it is not clear that there any sense of an 
‘industry morality’.  The structures are not there to ensure implementation, monitor compliance and 
record views of affected stakeholders.   While many firms advertise that they endorse and implement 
the code, it is not possible to ascertain whether they do or whether they are free-riders. 
 The code would therefore seem to be failing as an effective system of self-regulation.  In the light of 
the literature, several reasons for this may be suggested.  The leasing process involves individuals and 
organisations from different professions and lines of business making the organisational field highly 
complex.  This means that there is no single governing body and responsibility for ensuring code 
compliance rests with individual organisations.  This may distinguish this ‘industry’ from others that 
have successful schemes of self-regulation which typically have a central industry body overseeing its 
operation.  In addition, the interaction between government and self-regulation may be too much in 
favour of the latter.  The threat of legislation is not perceived as strong, which may be reducing the 
effect of the main incentive for compliance.   
The question then arises as to whether the voluntary Lease Code (or similar self-regulation) could ever 
work.  In order to address this, research is needed into the experience of other countries in regulating 
the property industry by voluntary means.  There is a wealth of research into self-regulation in other 
industries, some of which has been mentioned in this paper; research is now needed to look more 
closely at the structures of these systems and if there are similar industries that have been able to 
overcome the institutional difficulties to make a success of self-regulation.    
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Meaningful involvement of all industry players (including SMEs) in 
development? 
In the context of commercial leasing this is a diverse group.   
Industry players include landlords and their representative bodies as 
well as their advisers (lawyers and property agents).  The answer is 
yes as these bodies were all involved in development of the 3
rd 
edition as part of the working group: 
The Association Of British Insurers, British Council for Offices, British 
Property Federation, Investment Property Forum, The Law Society of 
England and Wales, The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 
The Forum of Private Business. 
Involvement of affected public (incl workers, consumers, public 
interest groups) in development? 
The key groups are those representing occupiers , large and small.  
These were represented in the working group in the shape of the 
British Retail Consortium, Confederation of British Industry, CoreNet 
Global, Federation of Small Businesses, 
Funding or support for SMEs or affected public? 
Not that we are aware of. 
Government involvement?  
Yes, Communities and Local Government and the Welsh Assembly 
Government were in the working group. 
Is the code publicly available? 
Yes it is readily available on the web. 
Did a standards development body develop the code? 
Yes in the form of a working group. 
What was the decision making process (eg consensus, majority 
voting etc)? 
We have no information. 
  Is the 
implementation of 
the code fair? 
Is there an imbalance of power in the industry? 
First there is not really a single industry.  The leasing process and 
consequent relationship involves solicitors and surveyors among 
others. There are strong individual firms of landlords that also have a 
strong lobbying organisation, as well as strong professional groups 
representing advisers.   To set against this there are an unknown 
number of smaller landlords who are not part of any organised 
group. 
Does the code impose different burdens on different industry 
members? 
We have no information on the costs of implementation but would 
assume that there are economies of scale for larger organisations 
who can spread compliance input over a larger number of individual 
property leases 
Are the rules clearly communicated to the industry and the 
affected public? 
The monitoring research suggests not.  For all three editions of the 17 
 
Code it was found that there are problems with dissemination.  For 
the latest edition there was a surprising lack of awareness among 
landlords, occupiers and their advisers with the exception of the 
largest landlords and occupiers. 
  Are the 
requirements of 
the code clear? 
Does it use plain language? 
 Yes, certainly the 3
rd edition makes a concerted attempt to use plain 
language, largely as it is aimed at small businesses be they landlords 
or occupiers. 
Are there clear obligations on the industry? 
The third edition was drafted with the intention of achieving this as 
the second edition had been criticised for being very vague and 
having little in terms of specific obligations on landlords.  Typical of 
this earlier edition is the following example: 
Both landlords and tenants should negotiate the terms of a lease 
openly, constructively and considering each other’s views. (2
nd Code). 
Yet, even for the 3
rd edition, at first sight the answer is no as the 
home page of the website gives conflicting messages. It first gives a 
signal to landlords that they do not have to follow it although with a 
general ‘government is watching’ threat: 
“The Code is voluntary so occupiers should be aware that not all 
Landlords will choose to offer Code-compliant leases. The 
Government, however, takes a keen interest in ensuring the property 
industry complies with this voluntary Code.”  
(www.leasingbusinesspremises.co.uk  2007) 
However there is a specific Landlord’s Code which contain clear 
expectations for lease negotiations, clauses and property 
management such as: 
“Landlords must make offers in writing which clearly state: the rent; 
the length of the term and any break rights; whether or not tenants 
will have security of tenure; the rent review arrangements; rights to 
assign, sublet and share the premises; repairing obligations; and the 
VAT status of the premises.” 
Some require landlords to simply respond to requests from 
prospective occupiers and a few are somewhat vague: 
“Tenants’ repairing obligations should be appropriate to the length 
of term and the condition of the premises.”  




Is there a compliance policy to govern monitoring and 
enforcement? 
Are there independent and knowledgeable third party audits? 
Is there approval of the internal audit process by independent third 
parties?  
No to all three questions – the only real monitoring is that funded by 
and for the Government.  For the 2
nd edition of the code some of the 
interested parties attempted to collect data via questionnaires but 
this was not impartial monitoring.  There is no ongoing audit at firm 
level.   There is no obvious ‘industry body’ to do it. 





Performance indicators suggested here are about the process: 
presence of ombudsman, process for industry and public 
complaints, reports of complaints, transparency of complaints 
process etc. 
There is no process either for the industry or for occupiers to 18 
 
complain about the operation of, or adherence to, the code. No 
‘body’ has any role in this regard. 






Performance indicators are about proportionality, deterrent nature 
of consequences and incentives for compliance 
There are no negative consequences at an individual firm level and 
similarly no firm level incentives for compliance.  There is a general 
threat of legislation which is associated with the periodic research 
done for the government ;  however the most recent research 
suggested that this threat is no longer perceived as strong. 
  Are the negative 
and positive 
incentives used? 
As above – no incentives so cannot be used. 
Relevance  Does the voluntary 
code address a 
fundamental 
problem or actual 
need? 
Are the objectives of the code still relevant? 
There are two main objectives of the code.  It promotes specific 
clauses and behaviours and has an objective to “promote fairness in 
commercial leases”.  There is also an information dissemination role 
and a further objective is stated to be “to ensure that parties to a 
lease have easy access to information explaining the commitments 
they are making in clear English.”   
Some within the industry would say that the first objective has 
largely been met through market mechanisms, although of course 
others would disagree. Ireland has within the last year abolished the 
use of upwards only rent review clauses in their commercial leases, 
the original catalyst issue for UK occupier pressure for lease reform 
in the early 1990s.  Given the similarity of Irish and UK lease terms, 
this suggests that lease reform is still a highly relevant issue in 
commercial property markets 
Can the behaviour that needs to be changed be identified? 
To a large extent the answer is yes in terms of the specific 
requirements of the Code.  There would not be consensus about 
which aspects of behaviour need changing  but the flexibility agenda 
of Government is quite well understood even if it is not well defined.  
The code monitoring has identified a number of issues and the 
Government has used these reports to identify issues such as 
assignment and subletting, upwards only rent reviews and the 
awareness of small business of the implications of signing leases 
where they would like behaviour to change. 
Does the problem the code addressed still exist? 
See above.  Also work such as the Occupier Satisfaction Index (OSI)  
(reference) suggests there are still many problem areas. 
Has the code been updated to reflect changing conditions? 
Yes, the new version is quite different to its predecessors and 
reflects changes in leasing practices. Significantly. It is clearly 
targeted at smaller landlords and occupiers.  It also tries to reflect 
the main concerns of occupiers. 
Is there a process in place for evaluation and revision of the code? 
The Code working group still exists but there appears to be no 
process for reviewing the code on an ongoing basis.  
  Are there 
competing codes 
or legislative 
No. The only confusion that might occur is between the various 
versions of the code: The monitoring research of the dissemination 
of the latest code suggested that professionals are aware of the 2
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instruments?  version and believe that to be the current edition rather than the 3
rd.  
Success  Have the 
objectives of the 
code been 
achieved? 
Performance indicators are about increase or decrease in 
customer/stakeholder complaints, number of violations, 
achievement of measurable objectives and the reputation of 
industry  
The answers to the questions on relevance of the code show how 
difficult it is to answer this question.  The lack of continual 
monitoring or procedures for complaint adds to these difficulties.  
Certainly there have been changes to lease clauses which might be 
seen to promote fairness; however the OSI suggests there are still 
problems to address.  In terms of dissemination – the monitoring 
research shows that this objective has not been achieved. 
  Are the firms 
capable of 
compliance? 
Performance indicators are first about the firms – their 
sophistication, expertise, provision of training, compliance 
regimes, resources given to compliance, familiarity with code 
requirements. Second, the industry body – its training activities, 
resources for monitoring etc. 
The point has already been made that, although the code is largely 
aimed at regulating the behaviour of ‘landlords’, the firms involved 
in creating and operating a lease span several types of business.  
Within each group there are certainly some very large and 
sophisticated firms who are used to complying with regulations, for 
example the property advisers typically belong to the RICS and the 
lawyers are required to be members of the Law Society.   There is 
some evidence of ‘training’ within these firms and their professional 
bodies have been active in dissemination to the members.  The BPF, 
representing landlords, has similarly been active in dissemination.  
However there is little evidence of firms adopting compliance 
regimes; our research found evidence of only one firm that ensured 
it had procedures in place to conform to the code before using the 
code logo.  It is also not clear the extent to which landlords (who 
endorse the code) ensure that their advisers and agents are using it. 
Beyond the large firms, there are many SMEs in all types of business 
that are unaware of the code and so unlikely to score highly on 
these performance indicators.     20 
 
  Are there 
incentives for 
compliance? 
Performance indicators include: logo, financial incentives, 
competitive advantage, regulatory incentives, high exit costs, 
negative consequences for non-compliance, identification as non-
complier. 
There is no logo for the 3
rd edition;  to show endorsement of the 
code agents typically put a line on the particulars such as this from a 
property being marketed  by Jones Lang LaSalle, property agents: 
LEASE CODE 
British Land supports the aims and objectives of the Code of Practice 
for Commercial Leases in England and Wales. A copy of the Code is 
obtainable from your advisors or from 
www.commercialleasecodeew.co.uk or from the Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors. 12 Great George Street, London, SW1P 3AD. 
The advantages of compliance are not clear; there may be some 
reputational advantage but there is no direct evidence of this.  There 
are certainly no specific and measurable consequences of non-
compliance.  Whether compliance is valued by customers is unclear 
without research into this. 
  Is there an industry 
organization or 




To develop yes – but not to administer. This role is dissipated across 
professional bodies and industry groups who represent various 
players with different inputs into the leasing process. 
  Are there 
mechanisms to 





Performance indicators include complaints procedures, reports, 
audits etc 
No – only the Government funded periodic research which address 
specific questions posited by government. 
 




No – only a general threat of legislation 




No sanctions so cannot be used. 
  Are there 
unintended or 
negative effects of 
the code? 
Performance indicators such as limiting completion or uneven 
burden between players being imposed 
None that are apparent; there is certainly no sense that conforming 
to the code limits competition.  Given that conforming with the code 
is arguably not particularly onerous then it does not overburden 
them. 
  Are there 
champions of the 
code? 
Do leaders support, promote and apply pressure on peers to 
implement code? 
Industry leaders do publicly support and endorse the code.  
However, while the BPF is quite vocal in encouraging members to 
conform, the professional bodies are reluctant to apply pressure on 
their members.   The monitoring research for the third code found 21 
 
that this reluctance is because they believe they cannot instruct 
members to undertake activities that may be ‘against their clients’ 
interests’, such as giving potential tenants information on the 
consequences of agreeing certain lease clauses. 
  Has an industry 
code achieved 
wide coverage? 
The monitoring research suggests not 
Alternative 
approaches 
Has the coverage 
been as wide as 
anticipated? 
No, government and the various code group bodies are disappointed 
with the monitoring findings on this. 
  Are the sanctions 
in the voluntary 
code adequate? 
There are none 





  Is there a need for 
uniformity of 
rules? 
Would legislation produce uniform rules and, if so, how would such 
legislative rules likely be developed? 
Given that there are specific actions that can be taken within the 
code to meet objectives, these could be developed into a set of 
legislative rules.  Other countries (such as Australia )have taken this 
approach although the operation of the legislation in Australia is 
controversial and has recently been subject to an Australian  
Productivity Commission report that discussed deregulation using 
the UK voluntary code model as an example. 




What would add to the credibility of the rules and the rule 
enforcement regime? 
The professional bodies are in a position to work with their clients to 
establish a set of verifiable procedures and to make many aspects of 
the code mandatory on their members.    





Some kind of individual transaction level monitoring procedure 
would add weight, but it is not clear who this would be and who 
would pay. 
  Are sufficient 
resources being 
devoted to the 








We are not aware of any significant resources being devoted to this 
apart from government funding of the monitoring research.  The 
Joint Working Group is an ad hoc group from the membership 
and/or administration of the various organisations and we believe 
they are unpaid. 
 
 